The Battle of the Bulge 1944–1945 – The Panzers of the Last Chance

Following the publication in 1994 of La Bataille des Ardennes by Jean-Paul Pallud — a work that established itself on both sides of the Atlantic — the release of Christer Bergström's book in 2017 revisited the actual losses of the US Army. This new work by Philippe Guillemot further enriches our understanding of the battle through fresh perspectives, hence its relevance: no, the German high command did not jealously hoard fuel far from the front, east of the Rhine — quite the contrary.

No, the bridges over the Rhine had not been cut. No, the rail network to the west had not been destroyed, and last but not least, yes, there was enough fuel for the attacking forces — who nevertheless ran into a genuine shortage during the battle. The author draws on a study of thousands of pages of archives, some of which clearly proved crucial in rethinking what we had long taken for granted about this singular and fateful battle.

On 12 December 1944, Field Marshal Model, commander of Army Group B, asked Colonel von der Heydte whether his airborne operation had a 10% chance of success. Von der Heydte answered affirmatively, and Model added that the Ardennes offensive had no more than a 10% chance of succeeding either. Those 10% had been mentioned before the German offensive of May 1940, which ended in the crushing victory of the Reich's armies. But since then, those armies had been worn to exhaustion.

Drawing on little-known documents and meticulous research, the author highlights the grains of sand that ultimately brought the German offensive machine to a complete standstill — the stifling of the offensive and its collapse under its own weight. A precise dismantling, backed by archival evidence, of theses that have nonetheless circulated since the end of the fighting, showing that those famous "10% chance" — in the end — neither the Third Reich nor Model had any longer.